REMARKS
ADVICE AND CONSENT IN THEORY
AND PRACTICE*
THE HONORABLE ROGER J. MINER**

Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution requires that the President of the United States nominate and, by and with the advice and
consent of the Senate, appoint the federal judges who will exercise
the judicial power conferred under the authority of Article III of the
Constitution. Today, that constitutional command is all but ignored. The President has abdicated his duty to nominate, the Senate provides no advice whatsoever, and the function of senatorial
consent is a mere formality in most instances. As regards the appointment of federal judges, the Constitution simply is not working
as the Framers intended. That this should be so at a time when the
appointment process is in the hands of those who profess a blind
adherence to the doctrine of original intent is strange indeed. The
difficulty of discerning the original intent of the Framers has been
expounded upon at great length and need not be reexamined. I do
pause to note that former Senator Eugene McCarthy recently spoke
of his support for the constitutional right of the citizenry to bear
arms, as long as the arms are of the type in use when the Constitution was written.' So much for originalism as a general proposition.
We know that the constitutional provision came about through
compromise. Listen to the debates, summarized as follows in the
records of the Constitutional Convention:
Mr. L. Martin was strenuous for an appt. by the 2d. branch [of the
Natl. Legislature]. Being taken from all the States it wd. be best
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informed of characters & most capable of making a fit choice. 2
Mr. Sherman concurred in the observations of Mr. Martin, adding
that the Judges ought to be diffused, which would be more likely
5
to be attended to by the [Senate] than by the Executive.
Mr. Govr. Morris [spoke as follows:]
It had been said the Executive would be uninformed of characters.
The reverse was ye truth. The Senate will be so. They must take
the character of candidates from the flattering pictures drawn by
their friends. The Executive in the necessary intercourse with
every part of the U.S. required by the nature of his administration,
4
will or may have the best possible information.
Mr. Madison disliked the election of theJudges by the Legislature
or any numerous body. Besides, the danger of intrigue and partiality, many of the members were not judges of the requisite qualifications. The Legislative talents which were very different from
those of a Judge, commonly recommended men to the favor of
Legislative Assemblies. It was known too that the accidental circumstances of presence and absence, of being a member or not a
member, had a very undue influence on the appointment. On the
other hand He was not satisfied with referring the appointment to
the Executive. He rather inclined to give it to the Senatorial
branch .... 5
Docr. Franklin observed that two modes of chusing the Judges
had been mentioned, to wit, by the Legislature and by the Executive. He wished such other modes to be suggested as might occur
to other gentlemen; it being a point of great moment. He would
mention (one which) he had understood was practiced in Scotland. He then in a brief and entertaining manner related a Scotch
mode, in which the nomination proceeded from the Lawyers, who
always selected the ablest of the profession in order to get rid of
6
him, and share his practice (among themselves).
How prescient they were! Consider this entry in the record under
the name of Mr. Ghorum:
As the Executive will be responsible in point of character at least,
for ajudicious and faithful discharge of his trust, he will be careful
to look through all the States for proper characters.-The Senators will be as likely to form their attachments at the Seat of Govt
where they reside, as the Executive. If they can not get the man of
the particular State to which they may respectively belong, they
2.

2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 41 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed.

1966).
3. Id.
4. Id. at 82.
5. 1 id. at 120.
6. Id. at 119-20.
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will be indifferent to the rest. 7
Actually, Mr. Ghorum only had it half right. Presidents also have
formed their attachments at the seat of government. The geographical origins of the following Supreme Court nominees of recent
years are illustrative: Burger, Scalia, Bork, Ginsburg, and Thomas
from the D.C. Circuit; Marshall, White, and Rehnquist from Department ofJustice headquarters. Long before there was a Washington,
D.C., and long before there was a Beltway, the Founding Fathers
warned of the myopic vision that would attend residence at the seat
of government.
What Luther Martin, that doughty Anti-Federalist, said about
Senators also applies now to Congressmen and even the President:
If he has a family, he will take his family with him to the place
where the government shall be fixed, that will become his home,
and there is every reason to expect, that his future views and prospects will centre in the favours and emoluments either of the general

government, or of the government of that State where the seat of
empire is established:-In either case, he is lost to his own State.8
It is rare indeed to find a former Member of Congress who does not
continue to reside in Washington, D.C. in a new incarnation. Senator Warren B. Rudman of New Hampshire recently announced that
he would not be a candidate for reelection. He indicated that he was
not inclined to return to the practice of law, although he was sure
that "the offers would be stupendous." 9 There certainly is a great
lure for those who leave office to remain in Washington. It goes by
the name of wealth. According to Senator Rudman, there is no
challenge left in serving in a government that is "not functioning." 10
This from the man who said that his "warmest memory" of the Senate was his support for David H. Souter for the Supreme Court.1 1
The fact remains that a compromise was reached and that the
Senate was given a role to play in the appointment of federal judges.
The Federalist Papers, the greatest public relations job in the history of the Republic, confirms this notion. The media market gurus
of today just cannot compare to the folks who wrote the Federalist
Papers, in my opinion. Of course, the Papers were designed to
reach'a literate audience, which is difficult to find in the last decade
7. 2 id. at 42.
8. Luther Martin, The Genuine Information Delivered to the Legislature of the State of Maryland
Relative to the Proceedings of the General Convention Lately Held at Philadelphia,reprinted in 2 THE
COMPLtE ANn-FEDERALIST 46-47 (HerbertJ. Storing ed., 1981) (emphasis in original).
9. Adam Clymer, Rudman, Irked by the Senate, Is Retiring, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 1992, at
A14.

10. Id.
11.

Id.
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of the 20th century. In Federalist No. 76, Hamilton put forth an
extraordinary effort to sell the citizenry the compromise worked out
at the Constitutional Convention. He aimed some persuasive language at those who preferred appointment by the Executive alone
and some equally persuasive language at those who preferred appointment by the Senate alone. He referred to the cooperative
function to be performed by the Senate in the appointment process
and described the purpose of that function in the following words:
To what purpose then require the co-operation of the Senate? I
answer that the necessity of their concurrence would have a powerful, though in general a silent operation. It would be an excellent check upon a spirit of favoritism in the President, and would
tend greatly to preventing the appointment of unfit characters
from State prejudice, from family connection, from personal at12
tachment, or from a view to popularity.
If the cooperation function of the Senate is to be performed, the
constitutional imperative of senatorial advice must be fulfilled. "Advice" means the same thing today as it did when the Constitution
was written. I have a dictionary almost 175 years old, and it defines
"advice" as "counsel" and "instruction."' 1 3 A more modem dictionary defines advice as "an opinion or recommendation offered as a
guide to action, conduct, etc." 1 4 It seems clear to me that the Senate cannot fulfill the advice requirement unless it has input in the
nomination itself. That has not happened for many years. It did
happen with excellent effect when Herbert Hoover was looking for a
successor to Oliver Wendell Holmes. Although Hoover sought a
noncontroversial midwestem Republican for political reasons,
heavy advice from the Senate impelled him to name Benjamin N.
Cardozo of New York. The nomination was made despite the fact
that there were already two New Yorkers on the bench-Stone and
Hughes, and one Jew, Brandeis. There is a well-known story that
Hoover showed his list of proposed nominees, with Cardozo at the
bottom, to Senator William E. Borah of Idaho. Borah is reported to
have said, "Your list is all right, but you handed it to me upside
down."' 15 Cardozo was easily confirmed, supported as he was by
business, labor, liberals, conservatives, academics, and the entire
legal community. As to the religion question, Senator Borah told
Hoover: "[A]nyone who raises the question ... is unfit to advise
12. THE FEDERALIST No. 76 (Alexander Hamilton).
13. WALKER'S DICTIONARY 12 (1819).
14. THE RANDOM HOUSE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 20-21 (rev. ed. 1980).
15. HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES AND PRESIDENTS: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF APPOINTMENTS TO THE SUPREME COURT 203 (2d ed. 1985).
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you concerning so important a matter."' 6 Hoover, of course, was
the only Republican President ever to appoint a person of the Jewish faith to the United States Supreme Court,17 and he was not too
wild about it, either.
The Cardozo appointment was a real case of merit selection. The
Framers of the Constitution really thought that merit would prevail
in judicial appointments. How wrong they were! Listen once again
to Hamilton, this time in Federalist No. 78:
[T]he records of those [legal] precedents must unavoidably swell
to a very considerable bulk, and must demand long and laborious
study to acquire a competent knowledge of them. Hence it is that
there can be but few men in the society, who will have sufficient
skill in the laws to qualify them for the stations of judges. And
making the proper deductions for the ordinary depravity of
human nature, the number must be still smaller of those who
8
unite the requisite integrity with the requisite knowledge.'
Hamilton was sure that the Senate would advise and consent only
on the basis of merit. He wrote:
[I]t could hardly happen that the majority of the senate would feel
any other complacency towards the object of an appointment,
than such, as the appearances of merit, might inspire, and the
proofs of the want of it, destroy.' 9
How does one define merit for purposes of federal judicial service? I think that Professor Henry Abraham, a great Supreme Court
scholar, had it right when he said that it could be defined in terms of
six components: demonstrated judicial temperament; professional
expertise and competence; absolute personal as well as professional
integrity; an able, agile, lucid mind; appropriate professional background or training; and the ability to communicate dearly, both
20
orally and in writing.
Objective merit no longer is the lodestar of federal judicial appointments. It probably never was, entirely. Even in the beginning,
when there were no political parties, the Federalists seemed to get
the nod over the Anti-Federalists. The Federalists still get the nod,
as I shall demonstrate shortly. Professor Abraham has identified
16. Id.
17. The appointments were: Louis D. Brandeis (by President Wilson, a Democrat, in
1916); Benjamin N. Cardozo (by President Hoover, a Republican, in 1932); Felix Frankfurter
(by President Roosevelt, a Democrat, in 1939); ArthurJ. Goldberg (by President Kennedy, a
Democrat, in 1962); and Abe Fortas (by President Johnson, a Democrat, in 1965). See id. at
389-91.
18. THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
19. THE FEDERALIT No. 66 (Alexander Hamilton).
20. ABRAHAM, supra note 15, at 4.
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three other bases for presidential nominations to the Supreme
Court: personal friendship; the balancing of representation or representativeness on the Court; and real political and ideological compatibility. 2 ' These factors, singly or in combination, have formed
the basis for judicial selection over the years in the Supreme Court
and in the lower courts as well. To these, I would add another factor that has surfaced in recent years-confirmability, that is, the ability not to create too great a stir when an indolent Senate undertakes
its consent function. Indeed, it is the ideological factor (concealed
and obfuscated to the greatest extent possible) and the confirmability factor that have most occupied the Chief Executives in recent
years. 22 Merit has been more or less consigned to the back seat. In
that connection, I think that it can safely be said that the President's
characterization of the most recent appointee to the Supreme Court
as "the best person for this position" 23 did not find unanimous acceptance in the legal community.
It seems that the center of all activity relating to judicial appointments at present is centered in the office of the Counsel to the President, Mr. C. Boyden Gray.24 It is there that the hot flame of
ideology burns brightly, tended by those who consider themselves
the descendants of the original Federalists but who indeed are not.
Just as the original Federalists dissembled in the use of their name
to gain political ascendancy, so do the Federalists of today. The
originals of course wanted to strengthen the new nation and to build
a strong central government at the expense of the states. However,
they adopted a name that was indicative ofjust the opposite. Luther
Martin opposed ratification of the Constitution and railed against
being labelled an Anti-Federalist. He wrote that those "who advocate
the system [of national government established in the Constitution],
pretend to call themselvesfederalists, [but] in convention the distinction was quite the reverse; those who opposed the system, were there
considered and styled the federal party, those who advocated it, the
antifederal."2 5 Despite the carping of Luther Martin, those who supported the Constitution made the label stick, and history ever will
know them as Federalists.
Those who call themselves Federalists today are hardly of the
ABRAHAM, supra note 15, at 5.
22. See generally HERMAN SCHWARTZ,

21.

PACKING THE COURTS: THE CONSERVATIVE CAMPAIGN

TO REwRITE THE CONSTITUTION XiV (1988) (discussing historical background and recent developments in "ideological judge-picking").
23. Gene Gibbons, Bush Names Thomas To Succeed Marshallon Supreme Court, REUTERS, July
1, 1991, availablein LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires File.
24. Michael Wines, A Counsel with Sway over Policy, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 1991, at A16.
25. Martin, supra note 8, at 47 (emphasis in original).
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same order. They are extremely conservative and see little good in

a strong central government. 26 For some reason, they do believe in
a strong Executive, but consistency is not their strong suit. Those
who seek to maintain the modern Federalist label are entitled to one
or more liberal thoughts. To them is attached the label "libertarian" Federalists. 2 7 The modern movement started among some
law students in the 1980s. These students perceived a clear and

present danger in the concept of the Constitution as a living document and organized as a protest against the liberal law professors
who they accused of advocating a too-expansive reading of the
Charter and of ignoring original intent. 28 They tended to cluster
around such academics as Bork and Scalia. 2 9 The force of history

and attachment to the coattails of political winners have catapulted
them to positions of power, first as law clerks, then as movers and
shakers in the office of the Attorney General and now in the office of

the President. This has been accomplished not by acquiring political power but by coopting it. Lee Liberman, a founder of the new
Federalists and now Assistant Counsel to the President, examines all
candidates for federal judgeships for ideological purity.3 0 It is well

known that no federal judicial appointment is made without her imprimatur. A recent dispatch in the New York Law Journalreports the
President's nomination of a judge to my court, the nominee being
described as a litigator in a New York City law firm and as "a director of the local chapter of the Federalist Society ....,,31
And so the center of power for the appointment of federal judges
has shifted away from Presidents and Senators to staff. In the case
of district judges, Senators of the President's party still are afforded
the right in the first instance to submit the names of proposed nominees for approval by the Presidential staff.3 2 This process should be
known as nomination by a Senator and advice and consent by the
Presidential staff. The incumbent President is known to have no interest in the process. In former administrations, the Attorney General played a large role in judicial selection. During the regime of
Attorney General Thornburgh, one Murray Dickman, a political op26. See generally Jill Abramson, Right Place at the Right Time, AM. LAv., June 1986, at 99.
27. Judge Scalia 's Cheerleaders, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 1986, at B6.
28. See Mark Rust, Our Forefathers, Ourselves, STUDENT LAw., Mar. 1987, at 36-38.
29. Al Kamen, FederalistSociety Quickly Comes of Age, WASH. POST, Feb. 1, 1987, at A3.
30. W.John Moore, The White House Lawyer Nobody Knows, 23 NAT'LJ. 1357, 1357 (1991).
31. N.Y. L.J., Mar. 26, 1992, at 1 (Update Section).
32. A Friend of the Constitution (Pseudonym), Congress, the President, andJudicialSelection:
Lessons from the Reagan Years, in JUDICIAL SELECTION: MERIT, IDEOLOGY, AND POLITICS 49, 54-55

(1990); Sheldon Goldman, The Bush Imprint on theJudiciary:Carnyingon a Tradition, 74 JUDICATURE 294, 297 (1991).
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erative and a nonlawyer who came to Washington from Pennsylvania with his boss, was the Attorney General's "point man" on
4
judicial nominations.3 3 Obviously, he deferred to Ms. Liberman.a
The present Attorney General seems to be little more than a con35
servative adjunct of the White House Counsel's office.
While a candidate for any federal court appointment must pass
muster by the Attorney General, the American Bar Association
(which is known to cave in whenever the administration threatens to
disregard it), the FBI, and the IRS, the most important muster point
is the office of the Counsel to the President. Staff is the key, just as
staff is the key in all of government. If one desires response from a
Congressman, a Senator, a Justice, the Secretary of a Department,
or an agency head, one must go to staff. It is no different in the
judicial selection process. It is becoming no different in the adjudicatory process itself.
With no input from the President and no advice from the Senate
(except perhaps the right of first refusal in district court appointments), the next step in the appointment of federal judges is Senate
confirmation. Again, there is the intervention of staff. The confirmation hearings make that clear, as staffers are seen passing notes to
the Senators during the proceedings. Staffers also are known to
leak confidential information received by the Senate regarding nominees.3 6 Do these hearings serve any purpose? In the vast majority,
they do not. The questions are mostly pro forma in the case of district and circuit judge confirmations. During my confirmation hearing for the Circuit Court, Senator Thurmond asked me whether I
understood that it was the duty of a judge to interpret the law and
not make the law. I said that I did. From the other side of the aisle,
Senator Simon asked if I understood that it might not always be the
case that a judge should interpret the law and not make the law. I
said that I understood that too. That was about the size of my hearing, except for a unanimous confirmation vote in executive session.
The Senate seems to turn its attention briefly to the confirmation
process only in the case of Supreme CourtJustices. While it is true
that a number of nominees to the Supreme Court have been rejected, the reasons for rejection today would seem to depend solely
33. Goldman, supra note 32, at 296-97.
34. See Moore, supra note 30, at 1357.
35. David Johnston, New Attorney General Shifts Department's Focus, N.Y. TiMEs, Mar. 3,
1992, at A17; Anthony Lewis, The Attorney Corporal, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 5, 1992, at A27.
36. Helen Dewar, Senate Effort To Find Source of Leaks May Become Trip to a Bottomless Pit,
WASH. POST, Feb. 9, 1992, at A5 (discussing investigation by independent counsel of Senate
leaks relating to Anita Hill's accusation of sexual harassment by Clarence Thomas).
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on the polls taken by the Senators and general public reaction to the
nominee.
It is interesting that no nominee for the Supreme Court made a
personal appearance before the Judiciary Committee until 1925,
when Harlan Fiske Stone appeared. Despite hostile questioning, it
is said that "he came through with flying colors in a performance
marked by strength, dignity, and articulateness." 3 7 Recent Supreme
Court nominees have shown little of these qualities in appearances
before the Senate Judiciary Committee. Of course, neither have
those who asked the questions. We are now treated to what is in
effect a staged, albeit bumbling, performance on both sides. The
nominee, aided by public relations experts, Justice Department
briefers, and those on the other side of the table who support confirmation, try to say as little as possible, using the old dodge: "I may
have to decide that matter."
Robert Bork, for all his faults, including his desire to attend an
intellectual feast when he had not yet been invited to eat, may have
been the last of the straight shooters. He answered honestly, directly, without guile and with some intellect, all the questions put to
him. His answers scared the hell out of everybody, and he was not
confirmed. He accurately predicted that direct answers would never
again be the norm, because nominees would be selected from those
who have not written or spoken about important issues.3 8 Those
who followed him have studiously avoided any controversial responses to questions put to them, in one case even ignoring what
the nominee himself had said and written previously. The hearings
have become an exercise in futility because of the failure to ask
proper questions and get proper answers.3 9 These public spectacles
should be eliminated unless they can be rendered meaningful. Perhaps counsel should do the questioning. Perhaps the nominees
should be required to appear immediately upon nomination without
being given time to prepare evasive answers. Perhaps it should not
profit the President's staff to seek out "trackless" nominees rather
than certified intellectuals like Bork. Of course, intellectual distinction has no political constituency. Perhaps staff shouldn't be involved at all-Senatorial staff or Presidential staff.
If I were a Senator, I would not tolerate evasion or stonewalling in
answering my questions. While a nominee may not disclose how he
37.
38.

ABRAHAM, supra note 15, at 194.
ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA

347 (1990).

39. F. Lee Bailey, Where Was the Crucible? The Cross-Examination That Wasn't, A.B.A.J.,Jan.
1992, at 46; Stuart Taylor, Jr., Confirmation Process Flawed... by Senate Cowardice, N.J. LJ., Nov.

21, 1991, at 18.
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or she would decide a particular case, there are a number of questions that he or she should be required to answer-questions respecting an understanding of history; questions about important
prior decisions of the Court; questions designed to elicit an understanding of the current issues confronting the Court; questions of
approach to judging, of philosophy, of adherence to stare decisis. I
would not accept an answer that obviously is untrue, such as one
that denies having taken any position on a controversial issue before
the Court that is under discussion by the entire nation. If I could
not get the answers I wanted, I would vote "no." I do not think that
there is anything out of bounds about requiring answers to questions about financial, sexual, or other misdeeds. Because of the importance of the federal judiciary in our nation, one who aspires to
membership in it must demonstrate excellence in all things. That
excellence should be demonstrated to the personal satisfaction of
the President and the personal satisfaction of each and every member of the Senate.
Excellence! What a wonderful and rare thing it is! Yet, it is the
cornerstone of all human achievement and is found in every vocation. James Bryant Conant said: "Each honest calling, each walk of
life, has its own elite, its own aristocracy, based on excellence of
performance. ' 40 It seems to me that the ability to recognize legal

excellence is one of the most important benefits you have gained
from your legal education and from your participation in the Law
Review. Aristotle tells us that "[w]ith regard to excellence, it is not
enough to know [it], but we must try to have and use it."' 41
Although we all should strive to excel, as Aristotle urges, not everyone can acquire excellence. What everyone can and should acquire,
however, is the ability to appreciate excellence in others. To have
such an appreciation, we must understand that people have different
abilities, just as they have different qualities and talents. All are not
equal when it comes to excellence. There are but a few who have
that surpassing ability to achieve exceptional performance in the

law. As lawyers, you should strive to identify and acknowledge superior legal talent and ability and to insist, as the bar did in that
shining hour when Cardozo was appointed, that only the best
among you be selected to serve on the Supreme Court and on the
40. James Bryant Conant, Our FightingFaith (baccalaureate sermon June 16, 1940). The
title is taken from a statement in an address by James A. Garfield, The Future of the Republic: Its
Dangers and Its Hopes (1873).
41. ARISTOTLE, THE NICOMACHEAN ETmics, bk. 10, ch. 9, reprinted in JOHN BARTLETr,
BARTLETT'S FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS

87:25 (Emily Morison Beck ed., 15th ed. 1980).
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lower federal courts. 42 The process of nomination and advice and

consent may have broken down for now and may not be functioning
as the Framers intended, 43 but the political process can make it work

again. That is the beauty of our system. And that is where you
come in and where I, as a federal judge, cannot go.

42. Henry J. Abraham, "A Bench Happily Filled:" Some Historical Reflections on the Supreme
Court Appointment Process, 66 JUDICATURE 282, 288-90 (1983).
43. Albert P. Melone et al., Too Little Advice, Senatorial Responsibility, and Confirmation Politics, 75 JUDICATURE 187, 187-88 (1992).

